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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to find out how the new cash transfer program, Takaful
and Karama, implemented by the Egyptian government is affecting the relationship
between the Egyptian state and its citizens. This is done through depicting the
accounts of the two main actors in this relation: the state and its citizens. In the quest
for achieving the objective of this study, a qualitative approach is being applied
through using content analysis to depict the account of the state and semi-structured
interviews to depict the accounts of the beneficiaries of and the applicants to the
program.
The study first puts this new cash transfer program in a broader context through
examining its relation to the current economic, social and political-economic scene in
Egypt. In a second step, the study finds how the beneficiaries of and applicants to the
program interact with the state and how they perceive some aspects of the program
such as conditionality and means-testing. In a final and third step, the study finds the
effect of this new cash transfer program on the relationship between community and
family members.
Three main findings are derived from this study. The first finding is that the social
policy in Egypt is ending more and more to be a liberal residual policy that is
consisted of a number of palliative measures which are constituting what is called a
social safety net. The aim of this net is to offset the effects of the economic reform
policies on those who are conceived to be the deserving destitute. The rest of the
population are asked to provide for themselves in the market. Cash transfers are being
used as if they are the magic bullet for development and complementary policies are
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being missed. Macroeconomic stability is becoming the overriding goal to which all
other goals, job creation and income protection, are subordinated.
The second finding is that while people do not consider means-testing and
conditionality as intrusive they tend to have their own ways to deal with meanstesting and targeting. Personal discretion and human intervention will always be there
and technology cannot be the cure for such defects especially in a context where
informality is the norm.
The third finding is that targeting is creating a state of competition and envy among
community and family members. People tend to compete over the scarce resource and
power relations will continue to play a role in such context.

4

List of acronyms
CAPMAS

Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics

CBE

Central Bank of Egypt

CCTs

Conditional cash transfers

IMF

International Monetary Fund

MOF

Ministry of Finance

MOSS

Ministry of Social Solidarity

PMT

Proxy Means-testing

UNRISD

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

WB

World Bank

5

Chapter one: Introduction
1.1 Background
Through the past four decades, two types of fears have controlled the political
economic scene in Egypt: the Fear of floating, and the fear of phasing out subsidies. It
seems that the currently ruling regime has been set free of these two fears. In March
2015, the Egyptian government introduced a new cash transfer program which is
dubbed as "Takaful and Karama". The significance of this program comes from the
context in which it is being implemented as the government announced that such cash
transfer program is mainly aiming at offsetting the effect of phasing out the in-kind
and price subsidy system on the poorest segments of the population. The program
acquired more significance after the loan agreement signed between Egypt and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Based on this agreement, the Egyptian state will
be applying an "economic reform program" in which phasing out the energy subsidy
system is one of its main pillars. Cash transfers are considered to be one of the main
components of the social safety net which is supposed to be contributing to the effort
of cushioning the effects of the reform program on the poorest and most vulnerable
groups of the Egyptian population.
According to the Household income, consumption and expenditure survey for the year
2015, 27.8% of the Egyptian population are living under poverty line (CAPMAS,
2015). This poverty headcount ratio was computed before the application of the recent
austerity measures which have been taken by the Egyptian government including: the
application of the value added tax, increasing the fees of some public utilities like
electricity and water, phasing out fuel subsidies and finally the devaluation of the
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Egyptian pound. So the poverty rate may have significantly changed as result of all
these policies combined.
Takaful and Karama are two different schemes. Takaful is a conditional cash transfer
targeting poor households with children while conditioning the benefits of the
program on a number of behavioral actions by the beneficiaries including school
attendance and health checkups. The conditionalities include: children in the age
group (6-18) must be enrolled in school and attend classes 85% of the time; pregnant
women should receive pre-natal care and necessary vaccination; and children should
get all immunizations. The conditionality feature of the program is not in place yet
despite the fact the program is running since about 3 years.
Karama is an unconditional cash transfer targeting the elderly, disabled and those who
suffer from chronic diseases.
The two schemes share one main feature: they are targeted programs mainly through
using proxy means-testing (PMT). PMT is a method which uses characteristics, which
thought to be highly correlated to poverty, of the household or its members to
estimate their consumption or incomes when other income data are unavailable or
unreliable. Such characteristics may include: the type of the dwelling, the type of the
toilet, the type of the assets owned by the household. Each of these proxy variables is
given a weight. A threshold is set and if the obtained income estimate (total weights
of the proxy variables) is higher than this threshold then the household or the
individual is considered ineligible for the support. If the estimated income falls below
such threshold then the household or the individual will be considered eligible for the
support.
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Geographical targeting was a first step as the program was phased-in in the poorest
areas firstly.
The program has been put in place by the prime ministerial decree no.540 for the year
2015.
The importance of this study stems from the context in which this new cash transfer
program is being implemented. A context which is characterized by a strenuous effort
by the state to withdraw from both the social and economic spheres. A withdrawal
which is reshaping the state-citizen relation and interaction and putting more pressure
on the cracked social contract which has been in effect since the 1950s.

1.2 The research question
The main question addressed by this study is: How does Takaful and Karama cash
transfer program affect state–citizen relationship and interaction?
The quest for an answer for the previous question will be in the light of answering
other sub-questions that are related to the two main actors in this relation: the state
and the citizens.
The state:
1- How does the Egyptian state perceive its role when it comes to welfare
provisioning?
2- Is the Egyptian state is using cash transfers as a silver bullet for development
or it is complementing it with other policies that address the problems of rising
poverty and inequality?
The Citizens:
8

1- How do the beneficiaries of the program are perceiving conditionality and
means-testing?
2- How the program is affecting the relationship among community and family
members?
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Chapter 2: Literature review
This literature review section is divided into four main sub-sections. The first subsection reviews the history and the political economy of social policy in Egypt. The
second sub-section is mainly covering what has been written on cash transfers and its
effect on material well-being. The third sub-section is trying to dig more in the
concepts of conditionality and targeting and the politics and political economy of
welfare in general and targeting specifically. The final and fourth sub-section covers
how cash transfers would affect the relationship between state and its citizens and
among community and family members. The first three sub-sections are mainly
related to the account of the state data analysis chapter while the last sub-section is
mainly related to the account of the citizens' data analysis chapter. The reviewed
sources are mainly: peer-reviewed journal articles, books, and studies and reports
written by the Egyptian government and international organizations.
Over the years, there have always been calls for reforming the in-kind and price
subsidy system in Egypt. There is an extensive literature available on the inefficiency
of this system. Those who are advocating for such reform include: international
financial organizations, policy makers and academics. The assumption behind such
call for reform is that the system is unsustainable because of its drawbacks which
include among others: poor targeting, leakage and wastage and the high cost of the
system resulting from the previous reasons combined (Assad & Rouchdy, 1999; IMF,
2014; Kamal, 2015; Karanshas et al, 2014; Koraym, 2013; Loewe, 2000, 2004; Sachs,
2012; WB, 2010). In such context, comes the attempt to phase out universal or nearuniversal price or in-kind subsidy programs and replace them with narrowly targeted
welfare programs including cash transfers. Karshenas and Moghadam (2009) argued
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that social policy is supposed to play an important role especially in the time of
economic reform. Social policy in MENA region is taking "the back seat and treated
as a residual or an afterthought to economic reform taking the shape of safety nets or
safeguards to reintegrate the marginalized groups that are dislocated by the reform
process " (Karshenas & Moghadam, 2009, p.S52). Social policy has become "a
palliative afterthought to address the worst social fallouts of economic
policies"(UNRISD, 2013, p.1). It could be argued that this is what happened and still
happening in Egypt especially after the application of what is being called "economic
reform" policies. The Egyptian government adopted harsh economic measures then
thought of using cash transfer programs as a palliative to the serious implications of
such economic policies.

2.1 The history and political economy of social policy in Egypt
Bottomore (1990) differentiated between two types of citizenship. The first is formal
citizenship which is being given to the member of the nation state while the second is
substantive citizenship which includes the three types of rights according to
T.H.Marshall's argument (1990): civil, political and social. So as Bottomore (1990)
argued, the person can be a formal member of a nation state but this does not imply
that he/she would enjoy the combination of rights depicted by Marshall. Standing
(2011) argued that such a person can be called a "denizen" not a citizen. "A denizen is
someone who…….. Has a more limited range of rights than citizens do"(Standing,
2011, 14).
Marshall (1990) argued that in the west and the well-established welfare states, the
three types of citizenship rights have developed in a chronological order. Civil rights
were the first to be formulated in the 18th century then followed by political rights in
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the 19th century and the last type of citizenship rights that floated to the surface was
the social rights in the 20th century.
In Egypt as in many other MENA countries, the package of social rights which have
been granted to the population in these countries were not based on citizenship rights
but were much associated with the aim of creating a social base of support to the
emerging regimes after the end of the colonial era (Karshenas & Moghadam, 2009).
In Egypt, starting from the 1950s, a number of social policies and welfare programs
have been introduced or enhanced (as for the case of food subsidy system which
started in the 1940s). These policies and programs included among others: food
subsidies, low-cost housing, subsidized transportation, free health and education
services, land reform and guaranteed government employment. In return for this
package of social policies and programs, the Egyptian citizens were deprived of their
political and civil rights. "Populist, redistributive measures were a means of nationbuilding, state formation and consolidation, and regime legitimization" (Karshenas &
Moghadam, 2009, p.54). So contrary to Marshall's depiction of the historical
evolution of citizenship rights, what happened in Egypt is that we started from the end
point of what happened in the west through putting in effect social rights and
concealing the other two arrays of rights: civil and political. Social rights were the
first to be attacked with the evolution of neoliberal policies as it was the core enemy
of this newly evolving ideology in almost all parts of the world with different degrees
(Hirschman, 1991). The main weakness of social rights is that they are substantive in
nature and require mobilizing and redistributing material resources while political and
civil rights are "procedural and can be institutionalized as universal human rights"
(Mishra, 1998, p.486). In Egypt, social rights were not just the core enemy of
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neoliberal policies but it could be argued that they were the only existing enemy as it
was the main existing array of citizenship rights that was in place.
Eping-Andersen (1990) differentiated between three welfare regimes: the liberal
regime which prevails in countries like America, the social democratic regime which
prevails in the Nordic countries, and the corporatist regime which exists in a number
of continental European countries, including Germany, which witnessed the first
contributory old-age pension in the history introduced by Otto Von Bismark. It is
argued that the introduction of this first social insurance scheme was mainly intended
to make the favored workers pledge their loyalty to the Wilhelmine autocracy
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). So such welfare regime that prevails in Germany and
continental Europe in general, is described as having its roots in what EspingAndersen calls "corporatist legacy". So it can be argued that what happened in Egypt
starting from 1950s resembles what happened in Germany in the late 19th century,
which is creating new class that pledges its loyalty to the ruling regime. Karshenas,
Moghadam and Alami (2014) described the welfare regime in the Middle Eastern
countries as "authoritarian corporatist social welfare regime". "Over time,
legitimization and the preservation of state power became the driving force of social
policy, thus making it increasingly incongruent with economic realities, newly
adopted economic strategies, and demographic trends" ( Karshenas et al., 2014, 727).
When the Egyptian state started to embark on economic reforms mainly aiming at
increasing the integration of the Egyptian economy in the global one, it was not able
to easily abolish subsidies on food or energy or to introduce very harsh amendments
to the stable social contract (Karshenas et al., 2014). This fact materialized in the
1977 riots over the subsidy cut attempt during Sadat's regime. Salevurakis and AbdelHaliem (2006) argued that it was known in Egypt that Mubarak's regime cannot
13

survive the elimination of subsidies. This reflects the effect which has been produced
by the 1977 riots and the fear that any radical cut in the subsidies in Egypt would
affect the political stability. Since then, social policy and especially subsidies have
been used as a tool for providing political stability. Piven and Cloward( 1971) argued
that "government's willingness to provide relief to the poor depends less on acute need
than on perceived threats to social security"(as cited in Esping-Andersen, 1990). The
Egyptian government was trying to reduce subsidies in a gradual way through what
Salevurakis and Abdel-Haliem (2006) called "subterranean means". Gaps were
created as a result of the gradual withdrawal by the state from the domain of welfare
provisioning. Such gaps opened the way for NGOs especially faith-based ones to fill
the role of the state especially in areas such as education, health and social assistance
(Karshenas & Moghadam, 2009; Karshenas et al, 2014; Jawad & Yakut-Cakar, 2010,
Sholkamy, 2008). Such a role is complementary and not sufficient by all means as the
welfare provisioning of the NGOs is very limited in scale (Loewe, 2000).
Historically, the main beneficiaries of the welfare provisioning in Egypt, especially
when it comes to social insurance, were the urban-based state employees (Karshenas
& Moghadam, 2009; Karshenas et al., 2014; Loewe, 2000). Such feature is still
continuing till today, as the vast majority of the insured people in Egypt are state
employees, while most of those working in the private sector, either formally or
informally, are less covered by social insurance. Although the social security pension
tends to be little in value and is not fairly adjusted to inflation, the government usually
increases it on an annual basis through laws (Helmy, 2004; Sieverding and Selwaness,
2012; Loewe, 2004). Additionally, while there is a minimum wage in the public
sector, such minimum wage is not existing in the formal private sector not to mention
the informal sector.
14

Egypt shares such features with other countries including for example Latin American
countries, and other parts of the developing world. Social protection in Latin
American countries was mostly provided for workers in the formal sector in urban
areas (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009; Bastagli, 2009; Saad-Filho, 2015). Egypt also is
passing through a very harsh structural adjustment program like the ones implemented
in many Latin American countries during 1980s and 1990s which resulted in acute
economic crises that led to rising poverty, inequality and vulnerability and one of the
responses to all these hardships was the introduction of conditional cash transfer
programs (CCTs) in many of these countries including: Bolsa Escola/Familia (Brazil),
Progresa/oportunidades (Mexico) and Chile Solidario (Chile) (Barrientos, 2010).
CCTs came as a response to the fact that many segments of the population in Latin
American countries were out of the coverage of formal social protection (Bastagli,
2009; Barrientos, 2010). Interestingly, the name of the CCT program in Chile
(Solidario) is similar to the CCT Takaful (solidarity) scheme while the name of
Karama (dignity) scheme is similar to the name of the old age pension in Bolivia
which is called "Renta Dignidad"(ILO, 2016a).
Egypt has a history with social assistance schemes. The first social assistance law was
issued in 1950, the law no.116, and the most prominent social assistance scheme used
to be the social solidarity pension (Maash-El-Daman) (Korayam, 2013). Social
solidarity pension is a monthly cash transfer given to orphans, widows, elders,
divorced women, unmarried women who reached 50 years of age and prisoners'
families when the sentence is 3 years or more.

2.2 Cash transfers and material well-being
The majority of the literature covering the area of social assistance especially cash
transfers, whether they are conditional or not, is mainly concerned with assessing or
15

evaluating the impact of such programs on the material wellbeing indicators such as
income poverty, human capital and labor supply. Little attention is given to the impact
of such programs on state-citizen interaction, or social costs of targeting, for example.
MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011) argued that this is mainly because
governments and donors are more interested in such material indicators that are more
related to economic growth. Handa and Davis (2006) argued that it is more likely that
the social assistance programs which are being supported, either financially or
technically, by international or regional development banks to have impact evaluation
of some kind while other social assistance programs which preceded such newly cash
transfer programs are not subject to the same thing. They contended that "the existence
of a rigorous impact evaluation can have an important effect on a program's reputation
and perceived ‘seriousness’ of purpose"(p.539). Takaful and Karama is supported by a
400 million dollars loan from the World Bank. The program enjoys a much better
reputation than the social assistance program, the social solidarity pension, which
preceded it for many decades.
It can be argued that as Latin America has been the field test of Washington
consensus policies in 1980s and 1990s, it has been the birthplace of the new social
assistance tool: conditional cash transfers.
CCTS have been hailed as a tool for reducing poverty and inequality in developing
countries especially in Latin American and Caribbean countries (Cecchini, 2014;
Fiszbein et al, 2009; Questa, 2007; Medeiros et al, 2008). However, the associated
decrease, either in poverty or inequality, is argued to have not been that remarkable.
Bourguignon et al. (2003) showed that Bolsa Escola program in Brazil reduced the
incidence of poverty by only a little more than 1% while Gini coefficient has fallen
half a point.
16

There is a consensus in the literature that the main aim of conditional cash transfers
programs is not just alleviating current poverty but also reducing the future incidence
of poverty by encouraging investment in health, education and nutrition (Rawlings &
Rubio, 2005; Fiszbein et al, 2009; Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006). The conditionality
feature of CCTs make them an instrument for long term human capital accumulation
aiming at breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty in addition to its aim
of reducing current poverty as a short-term social assistance (Rawlings & Rubio,
2005)
CCTS as an approach presumes that the supply side of social services, education and
health, is in place but the problem is with the demand side and here comes the role of
the conditionality to encourage parents to send their children to schools and health
centers. Conditionality would make little sense if the supply side of health and
education services is not in place (Freeland, 2007; Ghosh, 2011a; slater, 2011; SaadFilho, 2015; Son, 2008). Handa and Davis (2006) argued that if the schooling quality
and access is to be improved, the poor would take advantage of the educational
opportunities without the need for assistance of direct cash transfers. They also argued
that health and education conditionality which are being attached to the conditional
cash transfers divert resources and/or attention from spending on the supply-side of
these sectors which is the main way to sustain the long-term human capital
accumulation needed for reducing poverty. CCTs create contradictory effect for the
government, as while such programs are being adopted to be in line with the minimal
state goal, the demand-side conditions of the programs put pressure on the state to do
its role as a provider of health and educational services (Lomeli, 2009).
Despite the fact that CCTs tend to share three main features: a cash transfer, a
targeting mechanism and a conditionality, the application varies considerably in a
17

number of other features such as in duration, exit strategies and in compliancemonitoring (Bastagli, 2009). Handa and Davis (2006) argued that monitoring of
compliance was not very strict in the case of Bolsa Familia in Brazil but it was very
strict in the case of Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico to the extent that "the transfers
of all beneficiaries were routinely delayed by several months until compliance was
verified for everyone, despite the fact that programme compliance was well over 90%
among beneficiaries"(p.523). Bastagli (2009) showed that in Chile and Mexico,
compliance was monitored and verified before paying benefits to beneficiaries. In
Brazil, if the non-compliance of conditionalities is the result of lack of services,
monitoring of the conditionality-compliance tended to be eased (Hunter & Sugiyama,
2014; Saad-Filho, 2015). There is also a difference in the rationale behind introducing
CCTs in different countries. Bastagli (2009) argued that the underlying principle that
stood behind the introduction of Bolsa Familia was that of universalism. Such
principle of universalism in reflected in the high coverage rate of the program which
reached 25% of the population (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2014; Saad-Filho, 2015).
Bastagli (2009:5) argued that "in other countries, CCTs were originally introduced as
compensatory measures, targeting the poorest who were adversely affected by periods
of adjustment".
Studies showed that CCTs have a positive effect on schooling indicators, enrollment
rates, dropout rates and annual promotion rates to the next grade (Attanasio et al,
2005; Glewwe and Olinto 2004; Maluccio and Flores 2004; Schultz, 2004) and on
health indicators of the children (Attanasio et al, 2005; Maluccio and Flores; Getler,
2004). However it is also argued that there is no concrete evidence that the
conditionality itself is the factor behind improvements in schooling, health and
nutrition indicators in the case of CCTs (Bastagli, 2011; Freeland, 2007; Medeiros et
18

al, 2008; Slater, 2011; Schubert & Slater, 2006). In South Africa it was found that the
child support grant program had positive effects on health and education indicators
while it is not a conditional program (ILO, 2016b). Meanwhile, in Brazil, the
unconditional cash transfer program targeting the elders and the disabled was found to
"have an impact on the schooling levels of the youth in beneficiary families"
(Medeiros et al, 2008, p.16).
Das, Do and Ozler (2005) argued that one of the main goals of CCTs, in addition to
targeting poor households, is restoring efficiency when externalities exist and
externalities exist when people do not send their children to schools for example. It is
argued that the opportunity cost of the change of behavior (sending children to
schools instead of work) should be addressed, while designing and setting the benefit
level of CCTs (Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; Son, 2008). If the level of the transfer is
far below what the child can earn from working this would provide little incentive for
parents to send their children to school instead of sending them to work. In Honduras
and Mexico, a two-tier transfer is implemented and include a flat transfer for eligible
family plus a per-child component (Handa & Davis, 2006). The per-child component
was calculated based on the opportunity cost of child schooling (Handa & Davis,
2006). In the Egyptian context, the CCT scheme, Takaful, includes such two-tier
transfer.
Handa and Davis (2006) argued that CCTs focus exclusively on the human capital
accumulation of the children, which would take several years to be developed, and
tend to ignore the development of human capital and productive capacities of the
adults, which would have both long and short term effects on poverty alleviation.
Despite the fact that CCTs are mainly concerned with human capital development,
they tend to have a low eligibility period, usually three years, accompanied by exit
19

rules, so it would be more logical that the eligibility period would equal the education
cycle (Bastagli, 2009; Handa & Davis, 2006).
Policy makers usually express concern that cash transfers would induce the poor to do
two things: to spend more on the temptations goods and to work less.
Concerning the claim of using cash in spending on economic –'bads'-, e.g. alcohol and
tobacco, Evans and Popova (2014) conducted a systemic review on a number of
studies written on this issue in a number of low and middle income countries in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. They found insignificant impact or significant
negative impact of cash transfers, either conditional or unconditional, on the
expenditure on alcohol and tobacco.
Another concern expressed by policy makers either in the developed or the
developing context is that the cash transfers, either conditional or unconditional,
would affect the work incentives for both the eligible and non-eligible as the former
would be trapped in poverty and unemployment fearing the loss of the program
benefit while the latter might reduce their participation in the labor market aiming at
being chosen and being eligible for the program (Banerjee et al, 2015; Slater, 2011).
"The success of CCT programs at reducing current poverty depends on whether, and
the extent to which, cash transfers affect adult work incentives" (Skoufias & Di Maro,
2008, p.953). In their study, Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) did not find any significant
effect of Progresa/ Mexico on work incentives for adults. Also they found no effect of
the program on the work incentives for the non-eligible households. Similar results
were also reported in the case of Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Medeiros et al, 2008; SaadFilho, 2015). Saad-Filho (2015:1236) showed that "three quarters of recipients are
economically active…. And the vast majority claim not to have rejected jobs to
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remain in BPF-Programa Bolsa Familia-". It was found that the mothers benefiting
from child support grant in South Africa, which is an unconditional program, "were
more likely to participate in the labor market and more likely to be employed" (ILO,
2016b, p.117). Banerjee et al (2015) reanalyzed 7 randomized controlled trials for 7
cash transfer programs, conditional and unconditional, in 6 developing countries and
they argued that "despite much of the rhetoric that cash transfer programs lead to a
massive exodus from the labor market, we do not find overwhelming evidence to
support these claims"(P.3). Alzua et al (2013) found negative but small insignificant
impact of three CCTs on labor supply in three developing countries: Mexico,
Nicaragua and Honduras. But they reported a number of employment related
outcomes in the case of Mexico's Progresa including: an increase in the number of
hours of work by female beneficiaries resulting from the availability of time for
women as a result of increasing school enrollment and an increase in the wages and
labor incomes in eligible families as the program " allowed eligible males to move
away from agricultural work and toward higher-paying employment" (p.1280).
The value of the transfer as a share of the beneficiary's income or expenditure tend to
be low ranging from 4% of the beneficiary's total expenditure in Honduras to 20% in
Mexico ( Bastagli, 2009; Banerjee et al, 2015 ). The low level of the transfer, whether
it is conditional or non-conditional makes it hard for beneficiaries to stop working or
to reduce their work supply significantly (Bardhan, 2016). In the Mexican context,
Gledhill (2001: 146) argued that "welfare dependency has hardly been a problem for
most Mexicans, since only minorities ever enjoyed access to welfare in the northern
sense". This could be said about almost all countries in the developing world where
the social safety nets do not tend to cover the subsistence standard of living as the
benefits levels tend to be very low when compared to the situation in the developed
21

part of our world. Saad-Filho (2015:1238) puts it in another way as he argued that
"CCTs are self-limiting: they can initially provide a large share of the beneﬁciaries’
income, but only because these incomes are extremely low". The weak effect of cash
transfers on work incentives especially in the developing context could be attributed
to: the weak association between increases in income beneficiaries and benefits
phasing-out (Alzua et al, 2013; Bastagli, 2009), and the difficulty of performing
regular re-assessments of the beneficiaries' eligibility mainly as a result of the limited
knowledge resulting from not well-established data bases and large informal sectors
(Banerjee et al, 2015; Bastagli, 2009).
It is argued that means-tested welfare programs create unemployment and poverty
traps as the beneficiaries may not accept job opportunities because of the fear of
losing the welfare benefits especially if the job is a low-paying one with little job
security. Another problem is that if the person took the job and then lost it, he/she will
have to deal with bureaucratic procedures that would take a lot of time to get enrolled
in a welfare program again. An obligation free and a universal basic income is
proposed as a solution to unemployment and poverty traps resulting from mean-tested
and targeted welfare programs (Atkinson, 1996; Standing, 2017; Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017). Providing a universal cash transfer irrelevant of work status
would free people of the unemployment and poverty traps as people would not fear
losing benefits as a result of having a new job.

2.3 A world of conditionality: there is nothing called free lunch!
It is argued that there is no intrusiveness or novelty in conditionalities as they just
entail actions that "the parents are required to do for their children: send them to
school, vaccinate them and care for their heath" (Medeiros et al, 2008, p.10).
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CCTs are being criticized for its paternalistic approach as a result of conditionality
(Freeland, 2007; Saad-Filho, 2015; Veit-Wilson, 2009). Freeland (2007) argued that
"the term conditional smacks of Bretton Woods paternalism"(p.57). He also argued
that the act of attaching conditions to cash transfers is similar to that done by IMF,
WB and other donors when they impose conditions on countries receiving debt or
donations from them. The fact that beneficiaries would be deprived from the program
benefits if they were found not complying with the conditions is much similar to what
is being done by the IMF when it suspends the delivery of loan tranches if the country
is found not complying with the assigned reform program suggested by IMF staff.
Conditionality gives the impression that those who impose the conditions know better
than the poor and know what is best for them (Standing, 2017; Schubert & Slater,
2006). Conditionality also implies that the poor cannot be trusted hence it is not
enough to direct them to what is conceived as the best outcomes but they must be
monitored during the process of achieving such outcomes (Schubert & Slater, 2006).
The targeting feature of CCTs entails two types of errors: Type 1 error- exclusion
error- those who are supposed to be deserving the transfer are excluded, and type 2
error-inclusion error- where those who are supposed to be undeserving are included in
the program (Ghosh, 2011a, Saad-Filho, 2015; Sen, 1995; Standing, 2017). Sen
(1995:13) argued that "in trying to prevent the type II error of including the non-poor
among the poor, some type I errors of not including some real poor among the listed
poor would undoubtedly occur". Inclusion error in the case of Bolsa Familia and
Opportunidadas are 49% and 36% respectively, while the exclusion error recorded
59% and 70% respectively (Soares, Ribas & Osorio, 2007).
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Targeting is expensive, as it entails using funds and personnel to reach the intended
beneficiaries (Ghosh, 2011a; Standing, 2017). On the other side, it is argued that costs
of targeting are not prohibitive (Medeiros et al, 2008; Devereux, 2016). Medeiros et al
(2008:9) argued that "it is possible to argue over the limits and disadvantages of a
targeted cash transfer programme from several perspectives, but it is undisputable that
the costs of targeting are not a sound argument in favour of universal transfers".
Deveruex (2016) argued that countries tend to work in the framework of constrained
budgets and targeting is pragmatically justified in such context.
On the same vein, Conditionality is argued to be expensive and it can absorb a part of
the program resources because of the cost needed to monitor the compliance of
beneficiaries (Handa & Davis, 2006, son, 2008; standing, 2017). But it is also argued
that CCTs are still inexpensive when compared to other subsidy programs like fuel
and food for example. Such low cost feature of CCTs is one of the main reasons
behind its attractiveness for both international organizations and policy makers in the
developing countries (Lomeli, 2009; Molyneux, 2007; Son, 2008).
It is argued that conditional means-test schemes are more appealing to the tax-paying
middle and ruling classes than unconditional ones because those groups usually want
to guarantee that the poor must do something in return for the subsidies or cash
transfers they are getting and to prove that they deserve to be assisted (Barrientos,
2007; Handa & Davis, 2006; Gaarder, 2012; Graham, 2002; Medeiros et al, 2008;
Saad-Filho, 2015; Van de Walle, 1998). Medeiros et al (2008: 10) showed how "the
conditionalities would be something like the rightful sweat".
Both Sen (1995) and Titmuss (2006) argued that the benefits targeted at the poor end
up being of bad quality. This reflects the fact that programs that are mainly targeted at
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the poor usually lack political consensus and support especially from the tax paying
middle classes and elites (Medeiros et all, 2008; Van De Walle, 1998). Titmuss
(2006:45) argued that "poor quality selective services for poor people were the
product of a society which saw welfare as a residual; as a public burden".

2.4 Cash transfers and non-material impacts
Not much attention is being given to the non-material impacts of cash transfers
(Corboz, 2013; Gil-Garcia, 2016; MacAuslan & Riemenschneider, 2011; Molyneux &
Thomson, 2011), especially when it comes to state-citizen interaction and citizenship
(Oduro, 2015; Plagerson et al, 2012). "Citizenship remains a relatively new concept
within the literature on social protection and cash transfers in low and middle income
contexts"(Plagerson et al, 2012, p.970).
2.4.1 Cash transfers and state-citizen relationship
"Entitlement to social assistance such as cash transfers goes beyond poverty reduction
and is based on citizenship, not philanthropy or enlightened self-interest"(Oduro,
2015, p.29). Oduro (2015) argued that Cash transfers are not just about installing
safety nets but also it plays a role in building a social contract between the state and
its citizens. He also argued that those who are being excluded from state social
protection feel they are betrayed by the state. This feeling of betrayal affects the statecitizen relationship and the state's political legitimacy according to Oduro.
In their study about the effect of the child support grant on citizenship and statecitizen interactions in South Africa, Plagerson, Harpham and Kielmann (2012) argued
that cash transfers helped beneficiaries to "give definition to the state as a personal
actor engaged in their lives, increasing its visibility, and challenging preconceptions
of the state as passive, impersonal, unfair or unreliable"( p.975). They showed how
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citizens' interaction with state entities and state officials, state representatives, such as
social workers and police officers was the main way that helped cash recipients in the
process of characterization of an otherwise abstract notion of the state or the
government.
Adato, Morales Barahona and Roopnaraine (2016) showed that in the case of the
conditional cash transfer program in El-Salvador, the objective of strengthening
citizenship was explicitly stated in the program's policy documents. They argued that
such goal of citizenship promotion was facilitated through two main channels. The
first is informal education and trainings for beneficiaries, mainly women. The second
is the organizational architecture of the program as community committees composed
of beneficiary representatives and community leaders were created. The aim of such
committees was to "constitute a system of representation of beneficiaries, channeling
their requests and complaints, and interacting with other institutions of the
programme"(Adato et al., 2016, p.1178).
2.4.2 Targeting and social costs
In addition to its effect on vertical relationship between the state and the citizens, cash
transfers and especially its targeting feature are assumed to have an effect on
horizontal relationship among citizens themselves.
It is argued that targeting and means-testing undermine social cohesion (Etzioni &
Platt, 2008; Saad-Filho, 2015), while universality promotes it and also promotes
solidarity among different segments of the society (Etzioni & Platt, 2008; Forget,
2012; Ghosh, 2011a; Standing, 2017). Saad-filho (2007: 531) takes it to the extreme
as he argued that cash transfers in general, targeted or universal, tend to "foster the
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commodification of social life and the development of competition, which conflicts
with the social solidarity engendered by the pro-poor strategy".
It is also argued that targeting and means-testing are stigmatizing those who are
considered to be poor and hence it may decrease the take up rate especially among
those who are considered deserving (Sen, 1995; Standing, 2017; Titmuss, 2006).
Titmuss (2006:45) posed this question: "if all services are provided…. On a
discriminatory, means-test basis, do we not foster both the sense of personal failure
and the stigma of a public burden? And he contended that "the fundamental objective
of all such tests of eligibility is to keep people out; not to let them in, they must,
therefore, be treated as applicants or supplicants; not beneficiaries or consumers". Sen
(1995) argued that the word targeting and its analogy of a target that is being fired at
means that the objects of poverty removal are seen as passive recipients of handouts
or patients not as active agents. Jordan (1996) argued that in the social policy strategy
in UK, men and women were considered as victims of exclusion not agents of social
change (as cited in Ray Bush, 2012). Bastagli (2009:17) argued that "the residual
nature of many of the safety nets in Latin America is related to the predominant view
that such interventions should first and foremost provide mechanisms to tackle the
social costs associated with economic change and market imperfections". In the
document of the recent loan agreement between Egypt and the IMF, a similar
perception is being stated as the international organization is arguing that the main
aim of the social safety net is to protect the most vulnerable and poor groups who will
be affected by the economic reform policies (IMF, 2017).
On the other side, Hunter and Sugiyama (2014) argued that social programs do not
have to be universal and unconditional to produce positive non-material impacts
related to citizenship and beneficiaries' feelings of inclusion and agency. They
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contended that if means-testing and conditionality are designed and implemented
appropriately, they can have a role in citizenship formation. It is also argued that
means testing could be compatible with universality if the transfers are broadly
targeted (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2014; Huber & Stephens, 2012).
There is still a need to hear from those who receive welfare benefits and to find out
how welfare is affecting their relationship both with the state and with other members
in their communities. There is also a need to detect in the recent changes in welfare
policies in Egypt and putting it in a wider context to find out how such change is
reshaping the relationship between the Egyptian state and its citizens. In this context,
comes the importance of this study as it tries to depict the accounts of the two parties
on this relationship: the state and the citizens.

28

Chapter 3: Conceptual framework and methodology
3.1 Conceptual framework
In this study, a number of main themes stand behind the discussion: social justice,
equality, targeting, universality, and conditionality.
The following table shows how this study utilize these themes in comparison to the
way they are utilized in the policy arena by the Egyptian government.
What is adopted in the policy arena by

What this study adopts

the Egyptian government
In the social justice pillar of the 2030

Equality of outcome is also important.

Egypt vision, the Egyptian government

Levelling the playing field today and

interprets Social justice in the sense of

ignoring the effect of the inequality of

equality of opportunity.

yesterday is not just.

Targeting. Targeting is justified by

It is always about choices and

limited resources and budget constraints

opportunity costs. Is the priority is to

(MOF, 2017).

spend on mega projects or to spend on
health care and education sectors.
Universality or near universality access
is achievable if there is a will. It is a
matter of political choice.

Conditionality. Conditionality is

A right that is conditioned is not a right.

interpreted as a co-responsibility

Rights cannot be conditioned.

between the state and the beneficiaries.

Elementary education is already

It is also interpreted as a contract.

compulsory in the constitution.

29

Freedom should be for all, if capitalists
and the rich receive subsidies from the
state without conditions attached then
why such conditionality is imposed on
the poor.

3.2 Methodology and methods
Kaplan illustrated that method refers to how data is collected, and methodology refers
to the identification and utilization of the best approach for addressing a theoretical or
practical problem (as cited in Jackson et al, 2007).
In this study, I have utilized a qualitative research approach to find out how Takaful
and Karama cash transfer program would affect the relationship between Egyptian
citizens and the Egyptian state. The reason why I use the qualitative approach is that
the main research question and other sub questions of the study are mainly related to
perceptions of informants, and although perceptions can be measured quantitatively,
the qualitative approach will allow for more in-depth analysis and probing and would
be more conducive in helping answer the research questions. Also my questions
involve tacit knowledge and subjective understanding. Marshall and Rossman (2011:
53) argued that the qualitative methodology is highly suitable for the "research that
elicits tacit knowledge and subjective understanding and interpretations".

3.3 Data collection
The research depends mainly on primary and secondary data sources.
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Primary data was collected through Semi-structured interviews and participant
observation. Participants were recruited through informal networking and using the
snow balling technique.
The interviews were mainly focusing on the experiences and perceptions of the
respondents on the program. Sixteen interviews have been conducted as part of this
study.
Participant observation was conducted through field visits to the local social unit in
Madinet El-Salam district in East Cairo. A permission was gotten from the head of the
social unit and I have informed him with the purpose of my research.
Content analysis is another method that has been used. It was mainly used to explore
the account of the state. Secondary data sources which have been subject to content
analysis include: official policy documents, TV interviews with public officials
including mainly minister of social solidarity and the program director MOSS. I have
been looking out for a number of specific words while conducting the content
analysis: social protection, social assistance, social justice, equality.

3.4 Ethical considerations
Participants have been informed with the aim of conducting this research. Participants
provided written and oral informed consent. Illiterate informants provided oral
informed consent. The researcher made it obvious to the participants that the data will
be used for academic purposes only and that their participation in the research has
nothing to do with their enrollment in the program. It was also made clear to the
participants that the participation in the research is voluntary and that they have the
right to refuse to participate.
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The researcher received the approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the
American University in Cairo (AUC) in October 7, 2017, prior to the start of the
interviews.

3.5 Data handling and analysis
Field notes were used during conducting the interviews. Handwritten raw data were
then transcribed and classified under themes in relation to the main research question
and other sub-questions.
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Chapter four: the account of the state
Egypt is witnessing rising poverty and inequality. According to Credit Suisse (2014),
the wealth share of the top income decile increased from 61% in 2000 to 65.3% in
2007 and to 73.3% in 2014. Poverty increased dramatically during the same period.
Poverty increased from 16.7% in 1999/2000 to reach 27.8/5 in 2015 (CAPMAS,
2015). The Egyptian government respond to that by targeting what are conceived to
be little resources to the segments of the population who are conceived to be the
"deserving poor" through putting in place a social safety net. Social assistance in
developed countries is playing the role of residual safety net because most of the labor
force there is under social insurance coverage or protected by labour standards and
regulations (Barrientos, 2010). But this feature is not in place in Egypt as well as
many developing countries. Informality is the norm and labour market regulations are
weak or even non-existing.
It is a vicious circle, the state liberalized, privatized and integrated in the world
economy and the result was increasing poverty and inequality. The government
responded to that by seeking more minimal government and more liberalized
economy trying hard to integrate more in the world economy. It is the race to the
bottom.
Social policy in Egypt is more and more ending to be a liberal residual one, a minimal
social policy attached to a minimal state, where the state is limiting its social benefits
and targeting it to a narrowly defined groups; "deserving destitute" or the poorest of
the poor usually defined as the severe poor who have children, the elderly and the
infirm. The rest of the population, able bodied individuals, are left behind to provide
for and look after themselves in the market. This is maybe one of the reasons why
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CCTs and targeted cash transfers in general gaining ground and are being attractive.
CCTs are in line with such minimal and residual social policy as they are relatively
cheap with low cost budgets as a percentage of GDP especially when they are
compared to other subsidy programs (Bastagli, 2009; Lomeli, 2009; Molyneux, 2007).
The total cost of "Takaful and Karama" cash transfer program in the fiscal year
2017/2018 is L.E 7.75 billion which constitute about 0.6% of the total public
expenditure and 0.18% of the GDP (Ministry of Finance, 2017). What is interesting
about what was dubbed in the past as "structural adjustment programs" or being called
now as "economic reform programs" is that the first to be hit are the poor and they are
the last who could benefit from the claimed future fruits of reform.
In this chapter, I will be trying to analyze the account of the state through focusing on
its role in social provisioning and how it perceives it.

4.1 What poverty?
The slogan of Takaful and Karama program is "Egypt without indigence". Indigence
here refers to those who are extremely poor: the poorest of the poor. But what about
the poor without the suffix "est"? What about the near poor? What about poverty
itself? Is the goal only to alleviate extreme poverty but poverty and inequality in
general is not a big problem? Does the Egyptian government run other programs that
would address the problems of rising inequality and poverty? Is the Egyptian state
using cash transfers as a silver bullet to development? Who are those poor or the
poorest among them and how the state sees them?
Sen (1995:14) argued that while targeting, the state would deal with applicants as
potential criminals. In a publication dubbed "100 questions and answers about
Takaful and Karama", it is stated that those who will be enrolled in the program and
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then found to be undeserving, a warning will be sent to them to pay back the money
or a lawsuit would be raised against them. There is a tendency to conceal the poor in
the official discourse. The word poor is not much present in the public discourse or in
official policy documents as terms such as the "low-income groups"- "Mahdody ElDakhl"- or the "neediest groups" are being used interchangeably by public officials in
official speeches or in policy documents being issued by the government. In the social
justice pillar of Egypt vision 2030, three main strategic objectives are stated. "The
third objective focuses on positive discrimination towards marginalized and the most
needy social groups, including those below the extreme poverty line, homeless
children, people with special needs, the elderly, and residents of the most dangerous
slums" (SDSEgypt 2030, 2016: 146). It looks like that the Egyptian government is
focusing mainly on the neediest and the poorest and the rest of the population have to
provide for themselves in the market even if they are poor.
In South America and similar to USA, there is a tendency to depict poverty as a result
of lack of effort or responsibility not because of the lack of equal opportunities
(Handa & Davis, 2006; Graham, 2002). The middle and ruling classes there believe
that those who are receiving assistance from the state have to do something beneficial
for the society in return for such assistance. CCTs best serve such conviction as the
poor will be co-responsible with the state in the aim of human capital accumulation
through sending their children to schools and medical checkups. Such conviction
about lazy poor is also existing in Egypt among middle and ruling classes who tend to
show poverty as a lack of effort. In an interview with her, the minister of social
solidarity argued that the value of "Takaful" scheme is kept at a low level so that the
beneficiaries would not replace work with welfare. The director of "Takaful and
Karama" program in the ministry of social solidarity showed up in a number of TV
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interviews and argued that those who are poor and able-bodied do not need assistance
from the state and that the ministry will provide job opportunities for them. There is
always this talk that job opportunities are out there but the problem is that the youth
and the poor are not searching or that they look for high-paying jobs. The director of
the program stated it directly in one of the events which was held in one of Cairo's
luxurious hotels: "we offer job opportunities to young men but they refuse to take it".
Standing (2007) argued that the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the resurrection of the
distinction between deserving poor and undeserving poor as a justification for cuts in
public social spending. He contended that this was" a time when more attempts were
being made to explain unemployment as essentially voluntary, the fault of the
individual rather than the state of aggregate demand" (p.516).
"The word "undeserving" implies that the person is to blame for his plight" (Standing,
2007, p.517). The ruling elites are blaming the poor for their poverty and while they
call for cutting off subsidies to make the poor less dependent on the state and more
dependent on themselves, capitalists and industrialists are themselves depending on
the state and depending on what is called "corporate welfare" in the form of free plots
of lands, export subsidy, subsidized energy and tax credits and/ or exemptions. Rist
(2008) argued that the development industry always tries to depict the problem of
poverty as a problem of one actor who are the poor while the case is not like that as it
is a problem of two parties: the poor and the rich as he argued that for the richness to
exist there must be poverty. If the subsidy should be targeted to the deserving poor,
then the subsidies targeted to the corporate sector should be targeted as well to the
"deserving rich". The "deserving rich" should prove that they deserve to be subsidized
by the state. If we will condition the subsidies to the poor then we have to condition
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the subsidy given to the rich. The reciprocity principle should be universalized on the
whole population if it is going to be adopted.
The main justification of replacing in-kind or price subsidies with cash transfers is
that the in-kind subsidy is vulnerable to a number of shortcoming including wastage
especially through the misuse of it by the poor like for example using the baladi bread
in feeding the domestically reared animals and livestock. At the same time, one of the
justifications of conditionality is that governments are afraid that people would
misuse the cash through using it on spending on economic bads such as alcoholics,
cigarettes and gambling so they must be monitored and the cash can be given to the
woman in the household partly for that reason. While it is argued that giving cash to
women would empower them and balance the gender power dynamics in the
household (ILO, 2011), it is also argued that giving money to women and holding
them accountable for the achievement of the conditions, school attendance and health
check-ups, puts more pressure on women that is not put on men (Lomeli, 2009;
Molyneux, 2007; Saad-Filho, 2015; Standing, 2017). Saad-Filho (2015:1239) argued
that "CCTs use women as conduits to reach the main programme target, their
children". While, Molyneux (2007: 72) argued that "The underlying problem with
CCTs, then, is that they not only depend on gender divisions for their functioning but
in some ways they actively reinforce them". It is also argued that CCTs tend not to
promote gender equality but to reinforce gender hierarchy (Corboz, 2013; Gil-Garcia,
2016; Molyneux and Thomson, 2011). The neoliberal discourse based on
empowerment and participation tend to oversimplify the cultural and socio-economic
problems in general. In the loan agreement, between Egypt and the IMF, document, it
is stipulated that IMF will motivate the Egyptian government to improve the female
labor force participation by providing more public nurseries and improving the safety
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of public transportation. The problem here is that while the IMF is trying to show
itself as caring for every single detail, it is doing the opposite which is
oversimplifying the problem as if the nurseries and safety of transportation are the
main hurdles standing in the face of women's participation in the labor market.

4.2 What inequality and what social justice?
"Everyone in the modern world believes in equality of something. All modern states
are based on belief in some sort of equality and treat their citizens equally"
(commission on social justice, 2006, p.53). But the question is equality of what?
(Commission on social justice, 2006). "On hearing the term "inequality", many people
think in terms of achieving equality of opportunity. This phrase occurs frequently in
political speeches, party manifestos, and campaign rhetoric" (Atkinson, 2015, 9). "In
policy and political discourse, “equality of opportunity” is the new motherhood and
apple pie" (Kanbur and Wagstaff, 2014, 2). The previous two quotations reflect the
case in the Egyptian context of how the Egyptian state perceive equality or inequality.
In the social justice pillar of "2030 Egypt Vision", it is mentioned that the strategic
vision for social justice to 2030 is that "By 2030, Egypt is a fair interdependent
society characterized by equal economic, social, and political rights and opportunities,
realizing social inclusion". In her speech1 before a youth conference held in July
2017, the current minister of social solidarity defined social justice as "the equality of
opportunity".
Atkinson (2015) differentiated between two different types of inequality: inequality of
opportunity and inequality of outcome. He depicted that inequality of outcome of the
yesterday is affecting the inequality of opportunity today. A child of a person who

1

Link of the speech https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0sX_RVGXWVU
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owns 10 millions of Egyptian pounds is not on the same grounds with the child born
for a family living under poverty line. Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014) argued that in the
case of destitution it would be morally repugnant to condition the doling out of a soup
on the assessment of whether the outcome of being standing in the soup line is the
result of circumstances or effort. In the case of CCTs, I think that it is also morally
repugnant to suspend the benefits, supposedly are being directed to children, because
their parents failed to comply with the conditions. The government in this case is
holding the children accountable for the efforts and choices of their parents and in the
same time it is neglecting the fact that the circumstances of this child being born in
this family is something that is completely out of his/her hands. "A one-year old
infant cannot be said to exert effort to be immunized"(Kanbur and Wagstaff, 2014,
p.11). Inequalities in primary school completion and educational attainment is
attributed both to the circumstances and also parental effort (Kanbur and Wagstaff,
2014, p.11).
Is the fair and more equal society as mentioned in 2030 strategy, is going to be
achieved with lowering the maximum tax rate, suspending the capital gains tax,
increasing the regressive value added tax, and the non-existence of a wealth tax?
While governments usually overlook and reconcile with the administrative costs
resulting from targeting and conditionality, they do not do the same when it comes to
revenues that could be accrued from the rich through capital gains tax or wealth tax
for example. It is usually argued by the rich and the interest groups that such taxes
would have high administrative cost that would offset its yield and that there will be
difficulties in computing the tax base on which the tax should be levied (Aboulenien,
2016). The Egyptian government proceeded with a program like Takaful and Karama
while it entails high administrative cost but it has suspended the application of capital
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gains tax in the stock market because of the assumed administrative and logistical
difficulties related mainly to how to compute the tax base on which the tax should be
levied. Pressure by interest groups also played a role without doubt and that refers to
the importance of the voice. Unlike the poor, the rich do not lack voice. Before the
implementation of capital gains tax, the government bowed to the pressure done by
investors and exempted the free shares distributions from the tax and increased the
exemption threshold from 10 to 15 thousand pounds. After just one year, the tax was
suspended for two years and then for more three years. "Experience shows that the
most important constraint to the expansion of the tax base in the developing countries
is not poverty or the lack of managerial capacity to apply the law; the constraint is
primarily political" (Saad-filho, 2007, p.523). In the year 2015, when the Egyptian
government decided to suspend the capital gains tax on stock market transactions, the
IMF criticized such action on the basis that "the rich would pay less to cut deficit"2. It
is a little bit ironic that the IMF looks keener on distributing the burden of the
economic reform policies than the Egyptian government itself.
Usually the minister of social solidarity responds to the questions about inclusion and
exclusion errors by saying that we are in the first phases of the program and
something like that is expected and we are working on updating and refining our data
bases. Why such approach (just start and then things will get better) wasn't followed
in the case of capital gains tax or in the case of real estate tax. The state is ready to
enter people's homes to find out if they have a good toilet or a bad one to check if they
are qualified for receiving a number of hundreds of pounds. While when it comes to
the application of capital gains tax or real estate tax, what we witness are exemptions

2

See Ahmed A. Namatalla (2015, May24). Egypt Tax Delay Means Rich Pay Less to Cut Deficit: IMF.
Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-24/imf-criticizes-egypt-sdecision-to-delay-capital-gains-tax
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and then delays and suspensions. There is always this talk about how it is important to
preserve the secrecy of bank accounts but the state can easily get into a house to ask
about the marital relationship of the person in the house. The state is weak in the face
of the rich but it is empowered and with full capacities in the face of the poor. This is
obvious in how the Egyptian state tend to count on consumption tax as one of the
main and significant sources of taxation as it is an easily collected tax and does not
annoy interest groups or ruling elites.

4.3 Are Cash transfers enough?
"What can 400 pounds do in a time witnessing such inflation? I just want the
government to lower the prices and provide good services and then there will be no
need for such transfer". "What the government gives with the right hand, it takes with
the left one". The previous two quotations were answers by two different informants3
to one of the questions related to the value of the cash transfer.
In this section I argue that the Egyptian government is using "Takaful and Karama" as
if it is the magic bullet that, alongside the awaited and dreamed job creation that
would result from economic growth, would be enough and no more policies or
interventions are needed. In a TV-interview with her, the Director of the program
argued that the keyword is employment. The problem is that we are not living in the
golden ages of full employment. How employment could be the keyword if
informality is becoming the norm in the Egyptian labor market.
It would be a mistake to see the poor as those who are cash-deprived as poverty is
believed to be multi-dimensional (Ghosh, 2011a, 2011b; Sen, 1995).

3

The two informants are a beneficiary of Takaful scheme and an applicant to the same scheme.

41

Cash transfers are not enough measures to address issues of poverty and inequality as
cash is just one mean among others that aim at achieving an end so other policies
related to public social provisioning are needed (Fiszbein et al, 2009; Ghosh, 2011a;
Ghosh, 2011b; Saad-Filho, 2007, 2015; Sen, 1993, Sen, 1995; St.Clair, 2009). Ghosh
(2011a:67) argued that "The current perception that cash transfers can replace public
provision of basic goods and services and become a catch-all solution for poverty
reduction is false". Dealing with poverty require structural changes including among
others improvements in both the asset distribution and the occupational structure of
the population (Ghosh, 2011a; Medeiros et al, 2008). "Poverty and economic
insecurity are reflections of inequality, of income, wealth, power, and status"
(Standing, 2007, p.520).
"Governments that are genuinely concerned with poverty reduction have to orient
their policies and expenditure to such structural changes. Cash transfers may appear
as (welcome) temporary palliatives in such a context, but they simply cannot be
treated as a development panacea" (Ghosh, 2011a, p.68).
Saad-filho (2007: 530) argued that "In order to maximize their impact, pro-poor social
programmes should be universal. They should also prioritize the provision of public
goods and the social wage, rather than monetary handouts. Social programmes
including the provision of public education, training, public health, housing, water
and sanitation, parks and public amenities, environmental preservation, food security,
and affordable clothing, shoes and public transportation can have relatively low
managerial costs and they improve the standard of living of the poor directly".
The question here is whether the Egyptian government is supplementing cash
transfers with other social provisioning programmes?
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Transportation is one of the sectors which is being affected by the energy subsidy cuts
and witnessed an increase in the fees. The Egyptian government has increased the
price of the ticket for both the underground metro- by 100%- and the public buses- by
25%- run by the public transportation authorities in both greater Cairo and
Alexandria. The rhetoric by the Egyptian government is that public authorities
working in the sector of transportation are making losses. The rhetoric here is very
important because unlike food or energy subsidy, the government tend to label the
subsidy directed to transportation sector as "losses"(MOF, 2017). The amount of
subsidy directed to public transportation, either railways or public buses, is L.E 2.7
billion. Such amount is constituting 0.2% of the total public expenditure and 0.06% of
the GDP. Such increase in the fees of public transportation has no logical justification.
If the justification of phasing out energy subsidies is that the well-off tend to benefit
more from it and that resources should be targeted to the poor. Public transportation is
one of the sectors that deserve to be targeted.
In the housing sector, the situation is not looking promising as well. The amount of
subsidy allocated to the "low-income groups housing" in the 2017/2017 is zero. The
value of the unit in the "social housing" program, which is supposed to be providing
subsidized apartments, reached L.E 184 thousands in the year 2017. The application
deposit is L.E 11 thousands and the monthly installment starts from L.E 590 monthly.
According to the Household income, consumption and expenditure survey for the year
2015, the extreme poverty line for one person is L.E 322 while the national poverty
line is L.E 482. So the monthly installment of the units in the national housing
program is exceeding both the extreme and national poverty lines. One of the
conditions for applying for this program is that the applicant should be working in the
formal sector which means that this program is excluding those who are working in
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the informal sector (Shukrallah and Shawkat, 2017). The Egyptian government is
contributing to creating the bubble in the housing sector in Egypt either directly
through intervening as a real-estate developer or indirectly through its weak and lax
policies (Shukrallah and Shawkat, 2017). During the past three years, the Egyptian
government launched two big housing projects, Sakan Masr and Dar Masr, which are
mainly targeting middle income groups according to the government. The price of the
unit in "Dar Masr" project reached L.E 637 thousands while the price of the unit in
"Sakan Masr" project reached L.E 592 thousands. The Egyptian government is also
contributing to the housing bubble through its control over the distribution of land.
While the government grant plots of land for free to investors or at very low cost to
real estate developers, it does not do the same with the lands allocated to the housing
sector. In July 2017, the Egyptian government announced that 24024 plots will be
offered for the public through public draft system. About half of this number was
offered under the social housing scheme. 137807 persons applied for the 12721 plots
offered under this scheme. If the cash assistance is targeted to narrow segments of the
population because it is assumed to be a scarce resource, such justification is not
applied to the case of land in Egypt. Land is not a scarce resource in Egypt. The
question is why the government create such competition over a resource which is not
scarce?
For education and health, "The idea was that after the conditions for growth had been
secured, social policy could use a portion of the resources generated to provide social
services (such as education and health care) and assistance to vulnerable populations
excluded from the benefits of growth"(UNRISD, 2013, P.2). This is the conventional
wisdom being promoted by IFIs for what is called "economic reform" programs. Both
the IMF and the Egyptian government claim that phasing out energy subsidies will
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create the fiscal space for more spending on health and education and providing
assistance for the most vulnerable groups. The Egyptian government used an
accounting trick, through charging different sectors with interest payments, to reach
the constitutional mandated ratios of spending on education and health. The Egyptian
government also counted spending on sanitation and clean water services as part of
the spending on health sector with the same aim of reaching the constitutional
mandated ratios. Such actions places a question mark on the intention of the Egyptian
government to provide adequate resources for the two sectors in the future. Spending
on education and health sectors in poor and middle income countries tend to be less
costly as a result of the labor-intensive feature of these sectors in such contexts (Sen,
1999). So if the Egyptian government is really keen on human capital accumulation
and job creation, spending on these two sectors would serve such goal.
CCTs are externally funded by IFIs in a number of countries (Columbia, Honduras
and Nicaragua) despite such feature of the low cost of the program as a percentage of
GDP (Bastagli, 2009). Part of the financing of Takaful and Karama is coming from
the World Bank, the thing which is strange as the total cost of the program is not that
big and can be easily covered by the state's budget.
"low transfer amounts, while in principle generating a weaker incentive for workingage adults to reduce their labor supply, condemn CCTs to act as residual social
assistance" (Bastagli, 2009,3). In an interview with her, minister of social solidarity
stated that the low benefit level of Takaful scheme has two reasons; the first is the
scarcity of resources and the second is that a higher level would harm the incentive to
work. I would suppose that such reasons offered by the minister are credible, but why
the benefit level of the other scheme, Karama, is set at low levels? The living costs of
the two groups benefiting from this scheme, the disabled and the elderly, are high and
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there is no incentive to work that would be harmed in this case. Also if it is assumed
that the families benefiting from Takaful scheme can top up the benefits through
earned income, such assumption is not held in the case of the disabled or the elderly.
In Brazil, the value of the unconditional cash transfer targeting the elders and the
disabled is taking such fact into consideration as the benefit level is set at the
minimum wage (Medeiros et al, 2008). Targeting as a mechanism is mainly based on
the need principle. The main justification of targeting is that limited available
resources should be targeted to those who are really in need (Devereux, 2016; Hunter
& Sugiyama, 2014; Barrientos, 2010). So if the government is going to depend on
targeting as a mechanism for distributing its resources, the least thing to be done is to
really meet the needs of those who are seen as the neediest according to the
government itself. The maximum value of the transfer in the case of Takaful scheme
for a family composed of a father, a mother and three children in secondary education
is L.E 685 while national poverty line for a family composed of 5 persons is L.E 2410
which means that the value of the transfer is constituting about 28.4% of the poverty
line for this household. In the case of Karama scheme, the value of the transfer for one
person which is L.E 450 is still less than the national poverty line for one person
which is L.E 482. We have to bear in mind that this poverty line was computed for the
year 2015 and before all the recent austerity measures which have been implemented
by the government which led to a huge spike in inflation rates.
"Both historical and current experience suggest that social policy instruments, such as
conditional cash transfer programmes, work most effectively when complemented by
a broader set of policies, including employment and industrial policies that facilitate
investment in sectors that create jobs and provide a foundation for sustainable
improvements in earnings and the quality of employment" (UNRISD, 2013, p.2)
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4.4 Job creation and inclusive growth?
The main two goals of the economic reform program signed between Egypt and the
IMF are: inclusive growth and job creation (IMF, 2017). The question is what is the
meaning of inclusive growth in the first base? Suryanarayana (2008) showed how
inclusive growth is a very ambiguous and loose term that also lack a clear
methodology of measurement. So we have two questions here: what is inclusive
growth and how to measure it? The World Bank (2009) puts a number of
characteristics of what is called inclusive growth: It is the growth to which people can
contribute and benefit from; it is the growth which is broad based across sectors; it is
the growth that is inclusive of the large part of the labor force; it is the growth which
focus on productive employment; and finally it is the growth that entails equality of
opportunity and leveling the playing field for both firms and individuals. I think that
the World Bank complicated the mission of defining the concept.
While it is being argued that pro-poor growth strategies that focus on povertyalleviation, in the relative (when the incomes of the poor grow faster than the incomes
of the population as a whole) and absolute senses, are more preferable (Saad-filho,
2007; Rodrik, 2001), the World Bank (2009) argued that what is called inclusive
growth is in line with pro-poor growth in the absolute sense not the relative one.
The Egyptian ministry of finance (2017) and the IMF (2017) both claimed that one of
the main goals of phasing out energy subsidies is to discourage energy- intensive
industries for the sake of labor-intensive ones. But in July 2017 and with the start of a
new round of phasing out energy subsidies, the ministry of commerce and industry
announced that the fees of the natural gas supplies provided to industries will not be
increased.
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The two goals of the economic reform program sponsored by the IMF are intertwined
because job creation is one of the main pillars of what is called "inclusive growth".
The World Bank (2009: 2) argued that "the inclusive growth approach takes a longer
term perspective as the focus is on productive employment rather than on direct
income redistribution, as a means of increasing incomes for excluded groups". The
questions that arise here are: what jobs? In which sectors? What quality? What
matters here is the quality not the quantity of such job creation (UNRISD, 2013). Are
they formal and regular ones or non-standard ones that give little or no benefits
including social and health insurance for example? In which sectors these
opportunities are going to be affiliated? Is it in the real estate sector where most of the
job creation is in the form of non-standard informal jobs with no or little job security
or social benefits?
Social protection is argued to encompass, in addition to social insurance and social
assistance, labour market interventions such as the minimum wage legislation for
example. The minimum wage is only applied in the public sector. Large majority of
the Egyptian labor force work in precarious work environments with almost no
benefits especially social and health insurance. When it comes to the constructions
sector which is considered to be one of the most labor-intensive sectors, majority of
workers in this sector are subject to precarious highly dangerous labor environments.
When I asked one of the informants4 about his opinion if the eligibility age for the old
age scheme "Karama" is reduced from 65 to 60, he told me the following " even 60 is
too much, our job is a back-breaking repressive one. I'm 55 now and I can't work
because of my health condition. Even if people my age offer themselves in the labor

4

He used to work in the constructions sector but stopped because of his health conditions. He is
currently benefiting from Takaful scheme.
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market, contractors usually prefer young men to us". The previous statement shows
how is the work environment in one of the biggest labor-intensive sectors that absorbs
large amounts of investments either by the private or public sectors in Egypt.
Saad-filho (2007) argued that macro-economic stability should not be an objective in
itself but an instrument "for the elimination of mass poverty and the achievement of
secure, sustainable, equitable and empowering human development"(5016). He added
that such stability should not be "an excuse to undermine the government's pro-poor
programme" (5017). Macroeconomic policies have become more concentrated on
containing public debt and inflation, such inflation which is the result of
macroeconomic policy choices aiming at preparing the environment for the market to
work efficiently, instead of creating sufficient employment and protecting people's
incomes (UNRISD, 2013). This is what happened in the Egypt. The currency has been
devalued and the subsidy cuts have been introduced. The result was a hike in
inflation. The subsequent macroeconomic policy, mainly the monetary policy, is
focusing on controlling and containing this inflationary trend.
The official monetary policy currently pursued by the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is
inflation targeting regime (CBE, 2017). Inflation targeting is a monetary policy
strategy that adopts inflation as a nominal anchor. It entails anchoring individuals'
expectations of inflation around an announced numerical target of inflation. The
numerical target announced by the CBE is set at 13% (+/-3%) by 2018 Q4 and single
digits thereafter (CBE, 2017). Inflation targeting is being criticized for its rigidity that
would harm growth and employment creation (Cordero, 2008; Epstein, 2003, 2007).
The main policy tool used under inflation targeting is the short term interest rates
where monetary authority tends to tighten monetary policy through increasing short
term interest rates with the aim of hitting the inflation target. Since the devaluation of
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the Egyptian pound, the CBE has increased the interest rates for two times. Such
tightened monetary policy disincentives investment decisions. Inflation targeting is
criticized for its inability to deal with supply-side shocks (Frankel, 2014; Jha, 2009;
Boughzala and Cobham, 2011). The recent hike in inflation resulted mainly from

supply-side shocks not demand-side ones. This would raise concerns about the
effectiveness of inflation targeting in the fight against inflation. The flexible exchange
rate regime is making the Egyptian economy more prone to exchange rate volatilities
and supply side shocks that would result from changes in energy and food prices.

4.5 Takaful and Karama and the political economy of welfare in Egypt
Takaful and Karama program is weakly grounded on law. The program was initiated
by an administrative decree issued by the prime minister. This gives the program low
legal immunity in the face of any future change. The article no.83 of the Egyptian
constitution stipulates that the state is obliged to provide a pension for elders that
would guarantee a decent life for them. The fact that the Egyptian government
launched the scheme, Karama, through an administrative decree that includes another
scheme, Takaful, undermines the independence that such an elders' pension is
supposed to enjoy though the constitutional provision.
Takaful and Karama shares this feature with Bolsa Familia in Brazil despite the fact
that Bolsa Familia is being governed by a law (Medeiros et al, 2008; Saad-filho,
2015). Medeiros et al (2008) argued that BPC, unconditional cash transfer to the
elderly over 65 and the disabled, enjoys fiscal and political independence because of
the fact that the scheme is a constitutional right and its benefit level is set at the
minimum wage and because of that the scheme is less vulnerable to fiscal adjustments
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or budgetary cuts compared to Bolsa Familia. The minister of social solidarity stated
in a public press conference, held the day after the devaluation of the Egyptian pound,
that Karama's eligibility age would be reduced from 65 to 60. But this decision was
not implemented at all. This reflects how the program is weakly grounded on law
especially that the eligibility age is not stipulated in the constitution. The recent
increase in the benefit level of the two schemes, Takaful and Karama, was declared in
a public event and no decree was issued stating such increase.
"Targeted social transfer programmes are susceptible to politicisation. Transfers
might be directed…… to buy support (pre-election handouts in opposition
constituencies)" (Devereux, 2016, p.172). The recent increase in the benefit level of
the two schemes, Takaful and Karama, was declared by the Egyptian president in a
public event. The thing which shows that the program could be vulnerable to be used
for political and populist aims especially that it came as part of a package included an
increase in the benefit level of the semi-cash food subsidies and social insurance
pensions. Such package came just one year before the presidential elections which are
supposed to be held in mid-2018. According to the IMF deal document, "To ease the
adjustment process, about 1 percent of GDP in fiscal savings will be directed to
additional food subsidies, cash transfers to the elderly and the poor families, and other
targeted social programs" (IMF, 2017, p.13). So the increase in the benefit levels of
both cash transfers and food subsidies was planned according to the loan deal but it
seems that the Egyptian president tried to make use of it for populist aims. Such
action shows that welfare programs continue to play its historical role as a political
tool in the hands of the ruling regime.
The current Egyptian president handed over the program's payment card to the
beneficiary number 1 million. While conducting interviews, a number of informants
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did not know what I mean by "Takaful and Karama" as they know the program as
"Maash El-Sisi".
There is no politically-neutral mechanism for linking this new cash transfer program
to price indices. The thing which is also applicable to the case of the other social
assistance scheme, Maash Damaan, which was subject to periodic increases by the
state (Sabry, 2005; Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). This is also the case for the
minimum wage.
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Chapter 5: the account of the citizens
Kabeer (2005, P.1) argued that "the great deal of the theoretical debate about
citizenship today is taking place in an empirical void, where the views and
perspectives of ordinary citizens are largely absent. We do not know what citizenship
means to people – particularly people whose status as citizens is either non-existent or
extremely precarious – or what these meanings tell us about the goal of building
inclusive societies". "Welfare programs distribute benefits to citizens. Perhaps even
more importantly, by conveying powerful messages about how the state views poor
people, welfare programs shape people’s views about themselves as subjects or
citizens" (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2014, p.829). It could be argued that one of the
things that distinguish cash transfer programs from in-kind or price subsidy systems is
that the former entails a direct interaction with the state represented by public officials
and social workers in social units for example. In the case of the food subsidy system
in Egypt, beneficiaries interact directly with bakery's worker or owner in the case of
"Baladi Bread" or "El-bakal El-tamweeny" in the case of rationed commodities.
Those are just intermediaries and not state representatives. But in the case of the cash
transfers, people are dealing with government employees in social units and social
workers conducting visits to their homes.
For several decades, Egyptian people used to go to the baladi bread bakeries or
cooking gas warehouses and get the subsidized products without being asked if they
are eligible to such subsidy or not. Now they have to go and apply and then the state
check if they are eligible for the assistance or not and if they are found eligible this
does not mean that they will stay eligible for ever.
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In this chapter, I will be trying to reflect the accounts of a number of people whom I
have interviewed and met. Those people include: beneficiaries already receiving the
benefits of Takaful or Karama and applicants who were not enrolled in the program. I
interviewed ten beneficiaries and three applicants. I stopped interviewing more
informants because I found that I am not developing new insights and people are
repeating the same information. For example, almost all my informants welcomed
means-testing and conditionality.
In this chapter, I am mainly trying to depict the experiences of those informants with
the program. How those beneficiaries perceive means-testing and conditionality? How
they perceive the concepts of fairness and justice? How a targeted and conditional
cash transfer would affect the relationship not just between the state and its citizens
but also between people themselves?

5.1 conditionality: who is holding who accountable?
One of the main goals of the economic reform program currently implemented by the
Egyptian government is "restoring investor confidence" in the Egyptian economy
(IMF, 2017). But what about the confidence of the normal Egyptian citizens in their
economy and their government?
In November 4, 2016, just a day after the Egyptian government declared the floatation
of the Egyptian pound, the Egyptian cabinet held a conference in which the minister
of social solidarity stated that the eligibility age for Karama scheme will be starting
from the age 60 instead of 65. The minister claimed that such decision is mainly
aiming at increasing the take up rate of this scheme. This decision was not put into
force. The eligibility age did not change despite such statement in an official press
conference. Such lack of commitment and promising something while doing
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something else is not happening for the first time. The current Egyptian president
showed up in a number of public speeches on TV to tell people that the prices will
decrease and that the subsidies will not be phased out before increasing wages. The
Egyptian pound was then devalued, the subsidies were phased out and the fees of a
number of public services were raised. One of the most repeated sentences being said
during conducting interviews with beneficiaries or those who applied for the cash
transfer: "what comes from the government is better than the government". The
previous statement was being said as an answer to two questions, the first one was
about the opinion of beneficiaries about the value of the transfer while the second one
was asked to two of the informants who applied for the cash transfer while their
characteristics will not guarantee them eligibility. Those two informants are brothers
who are working as butchers and their household characteristics are supposed not to
guarantee them eligibility to the benefits of the program. They are both married and
hence they applied to Takaful scheme. One of them was being enrolled in the program
and the other was not. The one who was enrolled in the program was then considered
ineligible just after one month from being enrolled and his benefits were cut-off.
Previous empirical qualitative studies offered different perceptions of the
beneficiaries on conditionality. In the Brazilian context, mothers benefiting from
Bolsa Familia did not see conditionality as problematic "because these are things that
every mother needs to do anyway" (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2014, p.836). While in the
Ghanaian context, beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer program showed that
they did not like that somebody tell them what they should do with the money as this
makes them feel that they cannot make decisions on their own (Oduro, 2015). Almost
all my informants depicted that they have no problem with the concept of
conditionality and see it as a normal thing. One of my informants told me "It is my
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duty to send my children to the school even if the government did not ask me to do
that". This informant is a woman with three children and she is working in a small
workshop specializing in making small toys.
The main issue here is that the phase of monitoring conditionality is not in place yet.
So the question is whether their opinion will stay the same when the phase of
monitoring conditionality compliance will be in place. Bastagli (2009) showed that
teachers in Brazil tended to mark absent students as present and they explained such
action that they do not want to penalize poor people, while in Nicaragua, schools
tended to advance students to the next grade even if such advance is not merited. In
Ghana, it was reported that members of community implementation committees
showed reluctance in exposing the non-complying beneficiaries as they did not want
their fellows in the community to lose their benefits (Oduro, 2015). Such actions
poses a cultural aspect to monitoring the compliance of conditionality.
Molyneux (2007) mentioned the complaint by women who benefit from the CCT
program in Mexico as they asked why teachers would not be held accountable and
fined if they did not manage to accomplish their mission while they are being fined if
they did not manage to accomplish the conditionalities of the program.
I think the issue is not that people deem conditionality or means-testing as appropriate
or not because what they think will not make a big difference as they will be subject
to conditionality or means-testing whether they liked it or not. Beneficiaries of the
CCT program in Ghana depicted that they feared to speak aloud or complain against
conditionality because they feared that they would lose the benefits of the program
(Oduro, 2015).
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It is a little bit ironic to hold accountable those who receive a number of dollars
monthly but in the same time those staying in the headquarter of the IMF in
Washington are not held accountable to their policy recommendations that may lead
and already led to the impoverishment of millions of people all over the developing
world. In Jan 2017, IMF mission chief to Egypt Chris Jarvis stated that "The
exchange rate is more depreciated than we expected given the fundamentals"5. The
previous statement simply means that millions of Egyptians are suffering now from a
huge spike in inflation because of a mistake in the estimations done by the IMF staff.
The IMF estimated that the inflation rate would reach 18% in 2016/2017 while the
rate reached 32.9% in April 2017 according to CAPMAS statistics. The question now
is who is going to be held accountable for such wrong estimations? The answer is no
one. IFIs "are not directly representative or accountable to any elected authority"
(Mishra, 1998, P.491). Stigitz (2001) argued that "The IMF makes assertions and
predictions concerning its policies that are consistently proven wrong, yet its leaders
are seldom held accountable"(P.17). Stiglitz's argument is similar to William
Easterly's argument when he was comparing between planners and searchers as he
argued that what distinguish between searchers and planners in the field of aid
assistance are two things: feedback and accountability. Easterly (2006) argued that
searchers in the field are getting feedback and can be held accountable while this is
not applicable for the planners of the World Bank and other development institutions
who put big plans that yield modest if not no results. IMF staff and officials can be
called planners who barely know nothing about the living conditions in the countries
that they are devising policies for. Another problem in the case of countries like Egypt

5

See Lin Noueihed and Ahmed Aboulenein (2017, January 18). Egypt on track to receive IMF loan's
second tranche. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-imf-idUSL5N1F8598
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is how to hold the government or the regime accountable for their decisions. The
Egyptian regime is pursuing in carrying out a number of what is called "National
Mega Projects" such as the new Suez Canal and the new administrative capital. Such
mega projects are being carried out without adequate feasibility studies. So who will
be hold accountable for spending such billions of dollars on such projects? The
answer again is no one. Who will hold the minister of social solidarity accountable for
not reducing the eligibility age for Karama scheme?
So what we have is a hierarchical structure in which governments are being held
accountable before IMF while citizens are being held accountable before their
governments through for example usage of CCTs. At the same time, citizens cannot
hold their governments accountable not to mention the IMF. Standing (2017) argued
that those who devise the policies that steer people to a certain behavior out of the
belief that it is the best for them, those people not the steered should be held
responsible for the outcome of such policies. The poor are not irrational, they just lack
resources and opportunities which are unjustly distributed in our world today. Stiglitz
(2008) argued that if South Korea kept on walking through the lines of the static
comparative advantage notion, it would have been producing only rice till today. So
no country was born industrial by nature, it is the notion of learning by doing that can
illustrate the success of a country like South Korea that managed to have high tech
industries that are competitive to those existing in the west. The same can be said
about the poor and irrationality, no one is born irrational by nature but it is the
environment we live in and the social arrangements and power relations in any society
that make some people better off and others worse off. Sen (2000:5) puts it as the
following:
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"What people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities,
political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic
education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives. The institutional
arrangements for these opportunities are also influenced by the exercise of people's
freedoms, through the liberty to participate in social choice and in the making of
public decisions that impel the progress of these opportunities".

5.2 An intrusive state?
"The government has the right to enter the homes of the applicants", that is how one
of the beneficiaries from Takaful scheme expressed his opinion about means-testing
and home visits. Almost all my informants welcomed means-testing and showed that
they have no problem with home visits and did not consider them as violating their
privacy. Then, to be seen by the state was not expressed as a concern by the
informants. On the contrary, some of the informants consider means-testing as a
positive thing because it guarantees that only those who deserve the transfer will be
enrolled in the program. This may reflect that those who perceive themselves to be the
truly poor may "regard strict targeting and means-testing as working in their favor"
(Hunter & Sugiyama, 2014).
Hunter and Sugiyama (2014) argued that "Means-tested programs can foster inclusion
if they reach large number of people, provide clear information, are cast in positive
and supportive ways, and follow consistent rules that stem from an impersonal and
impartial authority" (p.841).
One of my informants said the following: "the state asks for all these documents
because they want to know everything about the applicants". While another informant
told me "they ask people to issue all these documents because they just want to collect
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money". "All what the government wants is documents so we give them what they
want to get", explained one of the informants. Two of my informants are living in
apartments in their family house which is owned by their father and they asked their
father to write them a rent contract to put it among the required documents. Another
informant told that he asked his father in law to write him a rent contract so that he
can apply for the program. This informant also told me that when the field researcher
came to the house he is living in, he let him enter an apartment that is furnished with
very little things. "Of course I did not let him enter the apartment I'm living in, you
want me to show him that I have all these electronic appliances!", that is how he
explained why he made him enter another apartment.
In a public event, the minister of social solidarity stated proudly that the ministry has
a data base of about 16 million citizens that was constructed thanks to Takaful and
Karama program. The minister stated that this data base is the biggest in the ministry
and it is the poverty data base. She then contended proudly that they do not just have
their national identity numbers, but they know as well information such as from what
the roof and the floor are made of. She simply listed the questions in the application
form of the program. But what if the information in this data base are not that
accurate? And if they are accurate, the more important is to ensure that targeting
based on these data is correct overtime. The thing which "is not just administratively
difficult but it is actually impossible" (Ghosh, 2011, p.70).
In interviews with her, the director of "Takful and Karama" looks keen on saying that
the human intervention in the selection of the beneficiaries is not part of the program
as the selection process is subject to a computerized statistical formula. Based on this
argument, the applicants are not subject anymore to arbitrary decision taken by social
workers or other street-level bureaucrats. The issue here is that the data needed for
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running such formula is being gathered by field researchers who are human beings not
robots. So the human intervention is still there. In the beginning of the program, the
form, which includes the questions that derive the data needed for running the
statistical formula, was being filled in social units but then the ministry contracted
researchers to conduct home visits to fill the form and to make sure that the data
provided by the applicants are checked for its authenticity. Two informants, they are
the wives of the two butchers whom I mentioned in the previous section, who are
living in the same house told me "the field researchers called us and asked us to meet
them in a place nearby our home. We went and met them and after finishing the
process of filling the forms, we gave them 50 pounds". Another informant told me that
"someone called me and asked me a number of questions and then told me that if
anyone asked you if a researcher visited you say yes". During my presence in the
social unit, I witnessed employees there telling two applicants that if anyone asked
them if their case has been researched they should say yes. Means-testing is criticized
for the arbitrary usage of authority by caseworkers and state level bureaucrats
(Standing, 2017). Arbitrariness and personal discretion is still there as well, during my
presence in the social unit, one of the employees told a woman who came with her
disabled son that he will not proceed filling the form with her because she exhausted
him with its lack of knowledge about many things. The woman was trying to apply
for Karama scheme for her disabled son. Another employee helped the woman and
completed the application process with her. One of my informants told me:
"While I was standing in the queue in front of the social unit, the employee
told me that she will not take my application because my father and my
husband are butchers and hence I do not have the right to apply. She did so in
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front of the people despite the fact that I have given her 3 mobile phone
recharging cards just the day before I went to the social unit to apply".
Using technology will not guarantee the disappearance of arbitrariness and power
relations and their effect on the targeting mechanism used to deliver any scarce
resource not just cash.
The social unit was the main location that witness the state-citizen exchange.
Experiences about the interactions with the state officials differed. One informant said
"they were good to us and dealt with us in a good way". Another informant told me
"they were pushing us and dealing with the people in a very bad way". The
perceptions of the informants on whether they consider those officials as representing
the state or not differed as well. One of the informants told me "the government has
nothing to do with the employees in the social unit, they are just employees and do not
represent the government".

5.3 Agency: agents (active citizens) or patients (passive recipients of handouts)?
The institutional design of the cash transfer programs tend to play an important role in
conveying the feeling of empowerment to beneficiaries (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2014;
Oduro, 2015). Almost all the informants stated that there is lack of communication by
the government and that they are being treated as passive recipients of welfare from
the state. One informant told me:
"They do not tell me anything. They do not say for how long I'm supposed to
receive the benefits and each time I go to the post office to receive the cash,
I'm not sure if I will get it or not".
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Most of the beneficiaries showed lack of knowledge about rules of the program and
even in some cases the value of the transfer. It is not just the beneficiaries, even the
head of the social unit told me that the phase of monitoring compliance of the
conditionality is in place while such phase is not in place yet.
In the interview with the head of the social unit, he told me "no booklets or brochures
have been given to the applicants" and then he pointed with his hands to a poster on
the wall behind him. On the poster, the eligibility criteria for Karama scheme were
specified. During my presence in the unit, a woman entered and asked one of the
employees about the documents required to apply for the program and the employee
wrote down the documents required on a small paper and handed it over to the
woman.
When I asked beneficiaries if they consider the cash transfer as their right and an
obligation on the state or they see it as a favor from the government. Only two
informants showed gratitude to the government but almost all of them stated that it is
their right and that it is not a gift from the government. One of the informants told me
"yes it is my right, but without El-Sisi this would not happen". This informant used to
work in the constructions sector and he stopped his work because of his health
conditions as he described their job to be back-breaking.
When I asked my informants, what they would do if the cash transfer was cut off.
Almost all of them seemed powerless stating that they will do nothing because
whatever they will do it will not change anything. When I asked them if they would
submit a grievance if their benefits were cut off, they did not show enthusiasm for
such action. "The government will not listen to us", that is how one of the informants
explained why she will not submit a grievance.
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When we compare the attitudes of those who are receiving social insurance benefits
and social assistance benefits, we can see how such treatment by the state of social
assistance beneficiaries as passive recipients of welfare is being conveyed to
beneficiaries themselves. In the case of social insurance, we can see beneficiaries of
social security program demonstrating in front of the headquarter of the ministry of
social solidarity asking the minister to increase the benefit level of the pensions or
even ask for the lay off the minister. The beneficiaries of the social security program
are organized in association and the representative of this association usually show up
in TV shows and public events to speak on behalf of the association. The same cannot
be found in the case of social assistance programs especially the program which lasted
for a number of decades (Maash El-damaan). The beneficiaries of this program are
not organized in any association and they do not tend to organize demonstrations in
which they ask for increasing the benefit levels of the program despite the fact that the
past increases in the benefit level of this program were happening over very long
periods and with very little amounts.

5.4 Why not me? I'm truly poor
When I hear the term "social safety net", I imagine so many people falling from a
high place and while falling in the air they tend to fight each other to get a place on
the net because there is no place for all of them. I also imagine the story of "Titanic"
when it was sinking and so many people were competing for a small number of
lifeboats. In "Titanic" lifeboats were targeted to the elderly and the women with
children and the rest were left to face their fate amid the ocean. In the case of social
safety nets, social assistance is being targeted to the elderly, the infirm and the
children and the rest of the population are left to face their fate in the ocean "the
market".
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As the liberal-residual social policy is based on the principle of need and targeting
those who are considered to be "the deserving poor", those who perceive themselves
to be the deserving poor tend to raise their hands up asking the state to enroll them in
the program because they are the only truly poor.
Inclusion and exclusion errors are not just abstract notions that illustrate how many of
the poor have been excluded and how many of the rich have been included. The two
errors have something to do with a number of things: envy and competition between
family and community members and perception of the fairness of the program and
trust in government.
"How lucky you are, you got enrolled in the program and we did not". Two
informants told me that their brothers told them the previous statement after they got
enrolled in the program while their brothers were not.
"Why not me? All my neighbors have received it, I also deserve this pension". This is
what one of the women told the employees in the social unit after she found that her
name is not included in the new list of the name of the beneficiaries.
Most of the informants acknowledged that the program created a state of competition
in the local communities and between family members. One of the respondents told
me "my sister in law told me that she wishes that the government will cut off my
benefits". She explained that she told her so because she asked her to give her the
value of the transfer in the first month because she helped her during the process of
application but she refused to do that.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to find out the effect of the new cash transfer program,
Takaful and Karama, on the state citizen relationship in Egypt.
Three main findings can be derived from this study.
The first finding is that the social policy in Egypt is ending more and more to be a
liberal residual policy that is consisted of a number of palliative measures which are
constituting what is called a social safety net. The aim of this net is to offset the effect
of the economic reform policies on those who are conceived to be the deserving
destitute. The rest of the population are asked to provide for themselves in the market.
Cash transfers are being used as if they are the magic bullet for development and
complementary policies are being missed. Macroeconomic stability is becoming the
overriding goal to which all other goals, job creation and income protection, are
subordinated
The second finding is that people have their own ways to deal with means-testing and
targeting. Personal discretion and human intervention will always be there and
technology cannot be the cure for such defects especially in a context where
informality is the norm.
The third finding is that targeting is creating a state of competition and envy among
community and family members. People tend to compete over the scarce resource and
power relations will continue to play a role in such context.
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Annex 1: list of the interviews
Interviewee 1: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 2: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 3: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 4: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 7: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 9: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 8: beneficiary of Karama scheme.
Interviewee 5: beneficiary of Karama scheme.
Interviewee 6: beneficiary of Karama scheme.
Interviewee 10: beneficiary of Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 11: applicant to Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 12: applicant to Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 13: applicant to Takaful scheme.
Interviewee 14: the head of the social unit in Madinet El-Salam district in East Cairo.
Interviewee 15: the former head of the economic justice unit in ministry of finance.
Interviewee 16: the statistician who formulated "Takaful and Karama" statistical
formula based on which the selection is conducted.
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